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NOTES
LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND
Several jurisdictions have recently abolished the traditional distinction between trespassers, licensees and invitees in determining
whether owners or occupiers of land are liable to persons who come
upon the land and receive injuries. In these jurisdictions ordinary
negligence rules will determine whether the owners or occupiers are
liable for the injuries.' Other jurisdictions, including Wisconsin,
still adhere to the traditional approach of separate and distinct
duties of care owed to trespassers, licensees and invitees. 2 However
in these jurisdictions recent decisions point toward a potential
change in judicial attitude.3
Whether the traditional approach creates problems of interpretation and classification should be evaluated to determine if a
change in the law is necessary. If such a change is needed, a determination must be made as to the form that change should take and
as to the kind of entrants on land to which that change should
apply.
I.

COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT

Distinctions among duties of care owed to trespassers, licensees
and invitees developed because of the privileged positions held by
medieval landowners in feudal society.4 The basic premise was that
a person should be allowed to use his land without the burden of
watching for and protecting those who entered it without permis5
sion or a legal right to do so.
Rigid application of the common-law trespasser, licensee, and
invitee categories, however, produced harsh results in some cases,
and judicial reluctance to deny a person recovery because of these
categorizations developed along with the attitude that human life
and its protections is more valuable than a person's right to unre1. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968);

Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mile High Fence Co.
v. Radovich, 175 Col. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
2. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 399 (4th ed. 1971).

3. See Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
4. Edwards & Jerome, The Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard,51
DENVER L. REV. 145 (1974).

5. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 359.
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stricted freedom in the use of his land.0
Because of the reluctance to deny a person recovery, duties
were imposed upon landowners to some classes of entrants upon
lands. Generally, for some trespassers and all licensees there developed a duty to warn of latent defects-those defects on the land
unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the entrant.'
Knowledge by an owner or occupier of frequent trespass on a
limited portion of his land was held to increase his duty of care as
to that portion. In addition, where trespass was foreseeable and
where the land was used for dangerous activities, a higher degree
of care was required.' For child-trespassers, the attractive nuisance
doctrine developed. Under this doctrine, a duty was imposed to
exercise reasonable care to eliminate dangerous conditions creating extraordinary risks of harm to children
In some jurisdictions the invitee- category was broadened to
extend the ordinary negligence standard to social invitees-persons
encouraged to enter the land by words or conduct of the owner or
occupier, regardless of any economic benefit-and to public invitees-persons invited to enter the land as members of the public
and to use the land for a public purpose.' This extension was made
because it was decided that an invitation carried with it the implied
guarantee that the premises were reasonably safe."
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN WISCONSIN

A.

Trespassers

A trespasser is one who enters another's premises without an
express or implied invitation from the other person, and solely for
his own pleasure, advantage or purpose.' 2 In Frederick v. Great
Northern Railway, 3 the court held that a possessor or occupier
of land owes no duty to a trespasser except to refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton injuries.
Wisconsin case development, however, illustrates a trend toward avoiding application of this narrow duty of care. One such
6. Id.
7. Edwards & Jerome, supra note 4.
8. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 361.

9. Id. at 373.
10. Id. at 388.
1I. Id. at 389.
12. WIs. J.I.-CIVIL INST. No. 8012.
13. 207 Wis. 234, 241 N.W. 363 (1932).
14. See also Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
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concept was the attractive nuisance doctrine. As early as 1913, in
Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin Railway,'5 a special attitude developed toward child-trespassers. The court stated that anyone who
maintains a dangerous object or condition accessible and attractive
to children owes a duty of ordinary care to prevent injury to them.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's reluctance to deny an injured
plaintiff recovery in a compelling situation has manifested itself in
the court's unwillingness to categorize one as a trespasser. In a
safeplace case, for example, the court held that an employee of a
lessee, who had rented only a portion of a warehouse, was a "frequenter" of the entire warehouse. The court determined that although the accident occurred on a portion of the premises not
leased to the tenant, the employee might reasonably and frequently
go there in the performance of his work."6 By so interpreting questions of fact, the court was able to avoid the trespasser category
and to allow recovery under Wisconsin Statute section 101.11. "
The reluctance to characterize a plaintiff as a trespasser was
also demonstrated in Wendt v. Manegold Stone Co. 7 where the
plaintiff was to supervise the set up of a machine on the defendant's
premises. Without authorization from the defendant, the plaintiff
came onto the premises to look at the machine and was injured.
The court held that the plaintiff was a licensee rather than a trespasser, implying a license from the negotiations of the parties regarding the machine.
The court has also avoided the trespasser designation by holding that a person upon the land of another is not a trespasser if he
is there with the consent of the owner, or if the person's presence
is reasonably anticipated and the person is perceived in a situation
of possible danger. 8 In Baumgart v. Spierings,"9 for example, the
court determined that the defendant was aware that his neighbors'
children frequently entered his land. When one of the children
was injured, the court imposed the duty of ordinary care and said,
"The record does not show any consent given to Karen [the minor
plaintiff] to enter upon the defendant's land, but the consent may
15. 152 Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60 (1913); see also Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products
Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351 (1934); and Fitzgerald v. Ludwig, 41 Wis. 2d 635, 165
N.W.2d 158 (1969).
16. Tomlin v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 220 Wis. 325, 265 N.W. 72 (1936).
17. 240 Wis. 638, 4 N.W.2d 134 (1942).
18. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 362.
19. 2 Wis. 2d 289, 86 N.W.2d 413 (1957).
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be implied from the conduct of the owner, from the relationship
of the parties, or by custom.""0 In this situation of the known or
tolerated trespasser, the owner or occupier 2of the land has a duty
to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him. '
The development of Wisconsin law with respect to trespassers
indicates a judicial reluctance to deny recovery. Damages for injuries have been awarded as a result of the court's refusal to classify
the injured entrant as a trespasser upon the premises.
B. Licensees
A licensee is one who goes upon another's premises with express or implied permission, for a purpose unconnected with the
business of the owner and which is of advantage only to the entrant
or to a third person other than the owner. 22 The licensor's duty is
limited to avoidance of injury to the licensee by means of a trap
or as a result of the licensor's active negligence.
In Flintrop v. Lefco, 3 which held that a social guest in one's
home is a licensee rather than an invitee, the court said a licensor
is liable for injuries caused by (1) a trap on the premises or by (2)
his active negligence. A trap, the court said, is a danger known to
the licensor, but concealed from the licensee, and which involves
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. The licensor has a duty to
warn of the trap's existence, unless it is opened, unconcealed and
obvious. "Active negligence" involves the carrying on of some
operation or activity in a negligent manner. 2 A condition of the
premises, such as a visible shoescraper on a patio, whether created
through an affirmative act of a defendant or by natural causes, is
25
not active negligence.
In order to broaden the scope of duties owed to a licensee, a
court would have to examine the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant, determine that the plaintiff, due to some particular fact, such as the finding of an implied invitation,2 has become
more than a licensee, and impose the higher, reasonable care standard upon the defendant.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 293, 86 N.W.2d at 415.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 362.
WIs. J. I.-CIVIL INST. No. 8011.
52 Wis. 2d 244, 190 N.W.2d 140 (1971).
Kaslo v. Hahn, 36 Wis. 2d 87, 153 N.W.2d 33 (1967).

25. Id.
26. See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); Prince v. United
States, 185 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
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C. Invitees
A person who expressly or impliedly is invited upon another's
premises for the purpose of aiding, transacting, assisting or furthering the business of the other, or who is on the premises for a
purpose mutually beneficial to himself and to the possessor of the
premises, is an invitee. 2 To classify one as an invitee there must
be (1) an oral or written invitation, or an implied invitation created
by acquiescence of the possessor or by acts on his part which could
lead a reasonable man to believe the possessor desired his presence
on the premises, and (2) an advantage to the defendant alone or
to both the plaintiff and the defendant created by the plaintiff's
presence. The advantage need not be direct, immediate or measurable in money.2"
An invitor, according to Stamberger v. Matthaidess,29 is not an
insurer,3 ° but he owes a duty of ordinary care to the invitee not
only as to the physical condition of the premises, but also31as to
known hazardous conduct of other persons on the premises.
As for the duty of the invitee to protect himself, the court, in
Zehren v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,32 held a person such as a store
customer is not required to see every defect or danger which is
plainly observable, nor to remember the existence of every defect
or hazard of which he has knowledge, especially when his attention
is attracted by a display of merchandise. Here the plaintiff, distracted by a greeting-card display, backed into the aisle and tripped
over a scale in plain view. The customer, said the court, is required
only to act as a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances. 33 This is a question34 of fact to be determined on the issue
of contributory negligence.
Traditionally, the invitor-invitee relationship was based upon a
mutuality of economic interests.3 In Schlicht v. Thesing,36 the
27. WIs. J. I.-CIVIL INST. No. 8010.

28. Id.
29. 37 Wis. 2d 186, 155 N.W.2d 88 (1967).
30. The statement that the owner or occupier is not an insurer of the premises means
that he or she has a duty only to exercise reasonable care and is not liable for all injuries
on the premises.
31. See also Prince v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
32. 11 Wis. 2d 539, 105 N.W.2d 563 (1960).
33. Id. at 542, 105 N.W.2d at 565.
34. Id. at 545, 105 N.W.2d at 566.
35. Schroeder v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 220 Wis. 642, 265 N.W. 559 (1936).
36. 25 Wis. 2d 436, 130 N.W.2d 763 (1964).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court took a more liberal view.3 According
to the court, a purely business realtionship is no longer an essential
prerequisite of invitee status. As long as a person is on the premises
by invitation and his presence benefits the invitor, he is an invitee.
This rule was adopted to protect the gratuitous, good samaritan
mother-in-law who babysits on the premises as a favor to the
owner, and who inevitably tumbles down the basement stairs after
3
mistaking the stairway door for a closet door. 1
A unique question of premises liability is raised by the Wisconsin "berry-picking" statute,39 which is designed to promote the
availability of private lands for public recreational use.4" An owner,
lessee or occupant of a premises owes no duty under the statute to
keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational
purposes. 4' Permission to hunt, fish or engage in other activities
upon the land does not carry with it the assurance that the premises
are safe for those purposes.42 However, liability is imposed for
wilful failure to guard against or warn about a danger or where
entrance for recreational purposes is granted for "valuable consideration." In such cases, there is a positive duty to keep the premises
43
safe and to warn of danger.
Two recent cases have limited this statutory immunity by narrowly construing it and by broadly defining the category of invitee.
These cases illustrate situations in which the court has generously
set the boundaries of the invitee category to prevent loss of recovery by a plaintiff who might otherwise be a licensee.
The plaintiff in Copeland v. Larson,44 was severely injured in a
dive off a resort's swimming pier. He had paid no admission price
to swim and had purchased nothing at the resort's food store.
However, evidence showed that swimmers, in general, accounted
for a substantial part of the store's business. The court, in finding
the plaintiff an invitee, defined an invitee as one who enters another's premises to the benefit of the other, or who enters and
shares some mutuality of interest with the owner or occupier. The
court also stated that a valuable consideration "may be the confer37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
38. 25 Wis. 2d 436, 130 N.W.2d 763 (1964).

39. WIs. STAT. § 29.68 (1973).
40. Garfield v. Wis., 297 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
41. Wis. STAT. § 29.68(1) (1973).
42. Wis. STAT. § 29.68(2) (1973).

43. Wis. STAT. § 29.68(3) (1973).
44. 46 Wis. 2d 337, 174 N.W.2d 745 (1970).
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ring of a benefit upon the landowner or a mutuality of interest of
the landowner and entrant. In such cases the common-law duty of
ordinary care

. . .

is not altered by sec. 29.68 excepting for the

express exclusion therein stated."45
In Goodson v. City of Racine," the court stated that any statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed to
be consistent with legislative intent. Therefore, the court further
limited section 29.68 by holding that the section was not intended
to apply to and thus protect governmental units as landowners.
A party injured on state recreational land, for example, would
not be barred from suit by section 29.68 and would have a cause
of action against the appropriate state employees for negligence in
the performance of their duties. If liability were proven, the employees would be shielded from monetary loss by Wisconsin Statute section 270.58, which authorizes the state to pay any adverse
judgment.47
III.

TREND IN WISCONSIN

Strict adherence to the three common law classifications has
not been altogether feasible, as is indicated by the development of
exceptions to strict categorization. Even by utilizing exceptions,
trial courts have encountered problems in making the classifications workable. These problems can be grouped into three general
areas: (1) the classifications fail to promote a basic policy of the
law and a basic social value-that human life is more important
than property and that a person should be held responsible for
injuries to others resulting from his own negligence; (2) the traditional distinctions are confusing and subject to inconsistent application; and (3) the use of classifications usurps the function of the
jury.
The California Supreme Court in recently highlighting the first
problem area of protecting human life stated:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the
law because he has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending
45. Id. at 347, 174 N.W.2d at 749.
46. 61 Wis. 2d 554, 213 N.W.2d 16 (1973).
47. Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis. 2d 31, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974).
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upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured
party as a trespasser, licensee or invitee in order to determine the
question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary
to our modern social mores and humanitarian values. The common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern determination of the question of
48
duty.
In its approach to personal injury cases, Wisconsin has generally expressed a similar view that a person has a duty to act in a
reasonable manner so as to avoid injury to another human being.49
Where negligent conduct does occur and results in injury, the policy of Wisconsin tort law has been to provide compensation for the
injured person. One may ask why, with regard to possessors of
land, the law departs from these fundamental concepts.
Muench v. Heinemann" illustrates the inconsistency between
the current system of classifying duties and the basic policies of the
law. The plaintiff was injured in an elevator mishap while making
a regular milk delivery to building employees. He sued the owner
of the building for negligent maintenance of the elevator, but was
denied recovery because the court held he was a mere licensee. The
court said because the plaintiff was on the premises to transact
business with the defendant's employees, the defendant had no
direct or indirect interest and, as a result, the plaintiff could not
qualify as an invitee. Such a decision contributes little to the goals
of protection of human life, compensation of injury and promotion
of safety-consciousness among property owners.
The second problem area is the inconsistency created by the
traditional distinctions. For example, one who trespasses once and
is injured will be denied recovery. When one trespasses enough
times to make his presence known to the landowner, he becomes
a licensee and is owed a greater duty of care. 52
One commentator has reasoned that the traditional framework
creates inconsistencies in an attempt to attain justice:
48. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 100, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103,443 P.2d 561, 568
(1968).
49. Johnson v. Prideaux, 176 Wis. 375, 187 N.W. 207 (1922); Brady v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W.2d 415 (1954); Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 191 N.W.2d
872 (1971).
50. Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 131 N.W.2d 48 (1965).
51. 119 Wis. 441, 96 N.W. 800 (1903).
52. Bernardi, Loss of the Land Occupiers'PreferredPosition-Abrogationofthe Common Law Classificationof Trespasser,Invitee, Licensee, 13 ST. Louis U. L. J. 449 (1969).
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* . . [T]he existing exceptions and judicial extentions which pervade the common-law rules manifest a basic confusion surrounding the application of those rules and are symptomatic of an
attempt to attain justice in the individual case while working
within a system of law which frustrates the attainment of that
end. This confusion and inequity in the area of occupier's liability
stems from an attempt to apply old common-law principles in a
society which no longer holds the landowner sacrosanct. ..

That commentator concluded that achievement of logical and legal
consistency is "impossible when the existing standards must be
misapplied to obtain the desired end.""
An English Law Reform Committee report,55 which resulted in
the Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957,11 concluded:
We think

. . .

that the existing distinctions between licensees

and invitees based on the presence or absence of some material
interest on the part of the occupier, or, alternatively, of some
material interest common to occupier and visitor is untenable as
a rational ground for fixing the occupier with a higher duty of
care towards the former than towards the latter. . .The present

law embarrasses justice by requiring what is essentially a quesby reference to an artificial and
tion of fact to be determined
57
irrelevant rule of law.
The third major shortcoming of the present classifications involves the usurpation of the jury function. With the classifications
that presently exist many cases may be decided as matters of law
on summary judgment or by directed verdict. As a result, the
fundamental question of whether the possessor of land acted negligently never reaches the jury. The jury is thus prevented from
applying a community standard in weighing the reasonableness of
the conduct of the possessor as well as the entrant." The avoidance
of the classification system could conceivably permit judges to
submit more cases to the jury, without having to determine the
plaintiffs status as a matter of law on summary judgment.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the three problems
53. Stites, Liability of a Land Occupier to Persons Injured on His Premises:A Survey
and Criticism of Kansas Law, 18 KAN. L. REV. 161, 162 (1969).

54. Id.
55. Cmd. No. 9305, at 31 (1957).
56. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 § 2 (1957).
57. Cited in McDonald & Leigh, The Law of Occupiers' Liability and the Need for
Reform in Canada, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 55, 65 (1965).
58. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

of traditional classification in Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc.," decided
in May, 1974. The plaintiff was injured while.sitting in a building
under construction. Despite evidence that he was on the construction site with permission, the jury found that the plaintiff was a
trespasser. The court upheld the verdict on appeal because the
plaintiff, who claimed licensee status, failed to show the existence
of a trap or to prove active negligence by the defendant. Although
Terpstra raised the issue of whether to adopt a reasonable man
standard, the court refused to consider the issue and instead upheld
the use of the traditional distinctions. Justice Heffernan, writing
for the majority, however, stated:
We are aware of the recent trend in other states toward the
abolition of the common law distinctions between trespasser,
licensee and invitee in terms of the land owner's obligations.
[citations omitted]
We choose, however, not to consider the abandonment of the
traditional rule in this case. If a change is to be considered, it
should be on the basis of a record made at trial, where appropriate motions are made and instructions requested that will trigger
the exercise of the trial judge's decision on the question as it may
apply to a particular case. 0
It is clear from the language of the decision, that, given the
proper case, the court would consider a change in the present law.
In fact at least one Wisconsin trial court has responded to the
Supreme Court's invitation. The defendant homeowner in
A ntoniewicz v. Reszczybski 8' demurred to the plaintiff's complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff, injured in a fall on icy steps, was
a mere licensee whose injury resulted from an unconcealed defect.
The trial judge, after discussing the common law justification for
categorization of entrants upon the land, the socio-legal changes
which have undermined this justification, and the possible effects
of a change upon Wisconsin tort law, overruled the defendant's
demurrer. In so ruling, the judge said that although no active
negligence was alleged, the rule of ordinary care applied."
Thus in Wisconsin the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to review the traditional classifications as a basis for determining the liability of owners and occupiers of land. At least one trial
59. 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).

60. Id. at 593, 218 N.W.2d at 133.
61. Case No. 418-027 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Aug. 12, 1974).
62. Id. at 21.
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court has adopted the more modern trend and expressly rejected
the traditional rule.
IV. CHANGES ELSEWHERE
In other jurisdictions, the trespasser, licensee and invitee triad
has come under attack. The United States Supreme Court, in
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,3 held that
common law distinctions involving premises liability would not be
recognized in admiralty cases governed by maritime law. In justifying this decision, the court said:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the
land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage
of feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban
society, with its complex economic and individual relationships,
modem common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate
increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the
classifications and subclassifications bred by the common law
have produced confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have
been spawned, older ones have become obscured. Through this
semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with
hesitation, towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single
duty of reasonable care in all circumstances."
Since Kermarec, common law distinctions have been abolished
in other jurisdictions.
These distinctions have also been abrogated by legislation.
England and New Zealand" ended the distinction between licensees and invitees with the Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957.66 The
Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform, in 1970, proposed a similar statute for Alberta. 7 The liability act imposes a
"common duty of care" toward all persons "invited or permitted"
by the occupier to be upon his land, and allows the parties to
63. 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
64. Id. at 630.

65. McDonald & Lee, supra note 57. The Occupiers' Liability Act was adopted by
Scotland in 1960.
66. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, § 2 (1957).
67. Alexander, Occupiers' Liability: Alberta ProposesRefonn, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 89

(1970).
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exclude or modify liability by express agreement. No mention is
made of trespassers, so apparently the traditional view was unchanged in this respect. In the United States, Connecticut has
legislated change by fixing a reasonable care standard for social
guests, as well as for business invitees 8
In the jurisdictions which have abolished the traditional classification, the critical factor has been the adoption of the view that
the preservation of life overrides the sanctity of property. In Smith
v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,Inc., 9 the plaintiff, a restaurant inspector, slipped and injured himself in the defendant's restaurant. The
jury decided for the defendant, after being instructed to determine
whether the plaintiff was a business invitee or a licensee, and thus
whether the defendant owed him a duty to keep the premises reasonably safe or to warn of known, concealed dangers. The plaintiff
appealed the finding of licensee status, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, stating ". . .we
do not believe the rules of liability imposed by courts in the eighteenth century are today the proper tools with which to allocate the
costs and risks of loss for human injuries."70 The court rejected the
idea of determining liability based on the status of the entrant.7"
This court has frequently recognized that questions which
involve moral and empirical judgments are best handled by representatives of the community as a whole. . . .Therefore, in the
absence of legislative action to the contrary, we believe that the
most effective way to achieve an allocation of the costs of human
injury which is acceptable to the community is to allow the jury
to function under
the standard of "reasonable care under all
'7 2
circumstances.

Another jurisdiction rejected the common law classification in
Rowland v. Christian.73 The plaintiff had severed tendons and
nerves in his hand when the faucet on the defendant's bathroom
sink came apart. The defendant had knowledge of the defect before
the accident, had asked her landlord to repair it and had failed to
warn the plaintiff, who was a guest in her apartment. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-557a (1969).
69. 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 99.
See also Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
469 F.2d at 102.
69 Cal. 2d 89, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
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that the plaintiff was a mere licensee who took the premises as he
found them. The California Supreme Court reversed on appeal
after finding that immunities from liability based on the common
law classifications "often do not reflect the major factors which
should determine whether immunity should be conferred upon the
'74
possessor of land.
The factor which should be considered to determine the immunity question are, according to the court, "the closeness of the
connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance."7 The proper test, the court said, was whether the occupier acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury
to others, 7 and concluded that "although the plaintiff's status as
a trespasser, licensee or invitee may in the light of facts giving rise
to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
status is not determinative." This ruling, however, did not apply
to trespassers.
Two cases have discussed the question of foreseeability. 8 In
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,79 the plaintiff policeman, walking his nighttime beat, stepped into a fence post hole on land
adjoining an alley and injured his knee. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that "it is the foreseeability of harm from the failure
by the possessor to carry on his activities with reasonable care for
the safety of the entrants which determines liability." 8
In Mounsey v. Ellard,1 the Massachusetts court said that
under the facts of the case, it could rest its decision on the narrow
74. 69 Cal. 2d at 99, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103, 443 P.2d at 567.

75. Id.at 567.
76. See also Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122

(1973).
77. 69 Cal. 2d at 100, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104, 443 P.2d at 568.
78. Hawaii adopted a similar position in Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452
P.2d 445 (1969), and in Gibo v. City and County of Honolulu, 459 P.2d 198 (1969), for all
persons reasonably anticipated to be on the premises, regardless of their legal status. In
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972), the Minnesota court declined
to make any change regarding the duty owed to trespassers, but did wipe out all licensee-

invitee distinctions.
79. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); see also Hurst v. Crowtero Boating Club, Inc.,
31 Colo. App. 9, 496 P.2d 1054 (1972) and Polster v. Griff's of America, Inc., Colo.
App.
, 514 P.2d 80 (1973).
80. 175 Colo. _
, 489 P.2d at 314.
81.
- Mass. _
, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
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ground that the plaintiff was an "implied invitee." The court decided, however, not to indulge in illogical legal fictions created to
avoid the harshness of the law.82 The court did not expand the duty
to include protection of trespassers and said, "Our decision merely
prevents the plaintiff's status as a licensee or invitee from being the
sole determinative factor in assessing the occupier's liability.",
As a guideline in determining reasonableness and foreseeability, the court suggested that the trier of fact examine the plaintiff's
purpose in entering the premises, his manner of entry, his conduct
while on the premises, and the defendant's consent or lack of consent.'
According to proponents of change, the presence of all entrants, even within the same class, is not equally foreseeable. For
example, the presence of a constant trespasser is more foreseeable
than the presence of a one-time trespasser. Use of the reasonable
man standard would simplify the decision-making process of making foreseeability of a person's presence on the land one factor to
consider in determining reasonableness. 7 As Justice Cardozo said
in Palsgraf v. Long Island RR., 8 "[T]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."89
In countering this connection, some courts have held that the
classifications are useful, that exceptions to the general rule can be
made whenever necessary,10 and that a single standard is, therefore,
unnecessary. Second, it is argued that courts alone should not
make a classification change. Justice Burke, dissenting in
Rowland, said that "Sweeping modifications of tort liability fall
more suitably within the domain of the Legislature. . .. "I' On the

other hand, the court in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.
82.
83.

-

-

Mass...,
Mass...,

297 N.E.2d at 48.
297 N.E.2d at 52.

84. Id. See also Sargent v. Ross, -

N.H. _

308 A.2d 528 (1973), wherein the

court, following Mounsey, held that a landlord must exercise reasonable care to avoid harm

to his tenants and must take responsibility for injuries caused by a defective condition on
the leased premises.
85. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 399.
86. See Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., N.D. _..._, 199 N.W.2d 899 (1972); Di Gildo
v. Caproni, 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969); Robles v. Severyn, 19 Ariz. App.
61, 504 P.2d 1284 (1973).

87. Edwards & Jerome, supra note 4, at 161.
88. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
89. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 100.
90. Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., N.D. _-, 199 N.W.2d 899 (1972).

91. 69 Cal. 2d at 102, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 106, 443 P.2d at 569.
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legislation, the court had the
stated that in the absence of contrary
2
duty to resolve this problem.1
Justice Burke argued also that a major change would "open the
door to potentially unlimited liability, 9 3 thereby increasing the
amount of litigation and the likelihood of verdicts favorable to
plaintiffs. It has been pointed out, in response to this argument,
that legitimate claims by injured parties rarely have been abandoned on the basis of status alone, that an ordinary-care standard
has been used in all other negligence-personal injury cases, that
juries generally have assessed well the actions of reasonable men, 4
and that a plaintiff, successfully blocked in one direction, will use
one of the many common law distinctions to qualify for and to
demand recovery.
Another question raised is whether the shift to a reasonable
man standard in all circumstances would, in effect, require the
property holder to be the insurer of his premises. In explaining the
duty owed to an invitee, Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction No. 8020
makes it clear that the owner or occupier is not the guarantor of
the safety of all those who come upon the premises. His duty is to
exercise ordinary care by keeping the premises reasonably safe,
and any liability on his part will be reduced by the amount of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. It should be noted also that low
cost liability insurance is generally available to protect the homeowner or lessee under such circumstances.
Those in favor of change contend that use of a single standard
will relieve the courts of time-consuming determinations of the
claimants' status and will eliminate some of the inconsistencies
within which the courts often find themselves entrapped. Opponents say the courts still will be forced to determine status in
deciding reasonableness and will continue to develop refinements
and distinctions with each new situation that arises.9 5 Even if this
latter point proves to be true, the courts will, at the very least, be
relieved of the burden of making status determinations as a matter
of law and will be able to send the cases to the juries, with status
to be considered as one question of fact.
92. 469 F.2d at 102.
93. 69 Cal. 2d at 102, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 106, 443 P.2d at 569.
94. A. Heinrichs, Constructive Knowledge of Defective Condition is Imposed Upon
Landowner, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 621 (1973).
95. R. Britton, Common Law Distinctions Between Licensee, Invitee and Trespasser
are Abolished in California and Replaced by a Standard of Ordinary Care, 14 VILLANOVA
L. REV. 360 (1969).
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If a case is allowed to reach the jury on a reasonable-care basis,
some critics of change fear that the standard will vary tremendously with each set of facts and with each jury. They argue also
that the public attitude toward property rights differs in rural and
in urban areas." On the other hand, it may be fair to say that many
jury verdicts are no more or no less accurate than court-rendered
decisions and that, in any event, the jury best represents the prevailing attitudes of the community in which the case is tried. Where
the jury errs or obviously exceeds reasonable limits, the court may
adjust accordingly on motions after verdict.
Finally, even if it is agreed that the case should go to the jury
to apply the reasonable man standard, a problem arises as to how
the jury should be instructed. Will the ordinary care test be used
for trespassers, licensees and invitees, or will it be applied only to
the latter two categories?
V.

FORMAT FOR AND EFFECT OF CHANGE IN WISCONSIN

If, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicates in Terpstra,97 it
would weigh proposals for change in Wisconsin premises liability
law, consideration must be given to the form this change would
take and the effect it would have on other closely related areas of
the law.
The narrowest approach would be to broaden the category of
invitees and the corresponding duty of reasonable care to include
social guests, who enter the premises by invitation but do not bring
to the owner or occupier any direct or indirect benefit." Inconsistencies and problems in the handling of other licensees and trespassers would, however, still remain.
The court in Rowland,99 for example, could have expanded the
invitee classification to include all persons invited upon the land,
it could have enlarged the concept of active negligence to include
the facts of the case, or it could have remanded the case to the trial
court with an instruction to find the existence of a hidden trap."'°
All such steps would have guaranteed the plaintiff a favorable
verdict, but the court avoided the temptation for fear of locking
96. Edwards & Jerome, supra note 4, at 166.
97. 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
98. Alexander v. Gen. Acc., Fire and Life Assur. Corp.,

(1957).
99. 69 Cal. 2d 89, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
100. Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 426 (1969).

-

La. _

98 So. 2d-730
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itself into a pattern that would create further confusion.
Most of the trend setting cases limit expansion of the reasonable man standard to licensees, either by expressly excluding or by
failing to mention trespassers. This development reflects the prevailing attitude toward the trespasser, who, unlike the licensee or
invitee, enters another person's land without permission or consent
in any form. Perpetuation of such an attitude, however, does little
to aid the trial courts, which must, to impose liability, struggle with
the inconsistencies and fictions inherent in the common law attempts to allow recovery. Foreseeability is one common thread
running through all the cases in which the trespasser classification
has been avoided. Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, for example, the possessor of land must exercise reasonable care if a
condition exists or an instrumentality is maintained which he
would reasonably expect to create a risk of serious harm and if he
could reasonably foresee that young children would be drawn upon
the land by the condition or the instrumentality."'
One commentator suggested therefore, that ordinary negligence principles be substituted for all classifications because the
finding of negligence is predicated upon foreseeable harm to the
plaintiff-entrant.0" The owner or occupier, then, would be required
to act reasonably only if the presence of a trespasser were within
the realm of foreseeability. This was the conclusion reached by the
trial judge in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court case,
A ntoniewicz v. Rezczynski.
The abolition of trespasser, licensee and invitee distinctions
with respect to presence upon private premises would cause no
significant changes in other areas of Wisconsin law.
The special duty, prescribed in the safe-place statute,103 to
make the premises as safe as their nature will reasonably permit,0 4
is limited only to places of employment"0 5 and to public buildings."1
With any change in premises liability law, safe-place would continue to be treated as a special exception because the statute deals
101. Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 154 N.W. 351 (1934).
102. Wilkins, The Future of Occupiers Liability to Trespassers in Canada,4 ALBERTA
L. REV. 447 (1966).
103. Wis. STAT. § 101.11 (1973).
104. Hrabak v. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 240 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1957); Presti v.
O'Donahue, 25 Wis. 2d 594, 131 N.W.2d 273 (1964).
105. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(2)(a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) (1973).
106. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(2)(h) (1973).
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with unsafe conditions and not with negligent acts as such, 0 7 and
because its purpose is to impose a duty greater than that required
by the common law'08 upon employers and owners of public buildings for promotion of accident prevention. The reasonable man
standard could be used by the court to determine the persons to
whom this higher duty is owed.
VI.

PROPOSAL FOR A SUITABLE JURY INSTRUCTION

Assuming that a reasonable man standard were adopted as the
rule for premises liability in Wisconsin, it would be necessary to
draft jury instructions expressing that standard. The following is a
suggested set of instructions which could be used in such situations.
Instruction A: Negligence-Duty of owner or occupant of
premises
The owner or occupant of the premises is under a duty to
exercise ordinary care in the management of the premises in
order to avoid exposing persons thereon to danger or harm.0 9
Instruction A establishes the standard against which the jury
would measure the defendant owner's conduct. The instruction is
borrowed from the California Civil Jury Instructions, but the utility of conduct versus the risk of harm balancing test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 291 is omitted here to make the
instruction consistent with current Wisconsin law. The term "management," as used in the instruction, would pertain to the manner
in which the owner or occupant uses the premises"0 and would
include the duty to maintain and to make necessary repairs.
Instruction B: Owner or occupant not a guarantor of the premises
The owner or occupant, however, is not a guarantor of of the
safety of persons who come upon the premises."'
Instruction B is consistent with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
holding in Stamberger v. Matthaidess."2 The purpose of this instruction is to stress to the jury that the defendant has a duty only
to exercise reasonable care and is not, therefore, liable under every
107. Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973).

108. A. McKinnon, A Survey of the Safe Place Doctrine,46 MARQ. L.
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(1962).

109. CALIF. J. I.-CIVIL (5th ed.) § 8.00.
110. Frye v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 2d 575, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965).

111. See Wis. J. I.-CIvIL No. 8020.
112. 37 Wis. 2d 186, 155 N.W.2d 88 (1967).

130, 131
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circumstance or for every injury occurring on his premises. The
defendant's right to use and enjoy his land must be protected from
any unreasonable imposition of liability.
Instruction C: Duty owed by owner or occupant of premises
The owner or occupant of the premises must exercise ordinary care to discover defective or dangerous conditions existing
on the premises and to take reasonable and effective steps to
remedy them. If he fails to discover and correct conditions which
a reasonably prudent person would have discovered under the
same or similar circumstances, he fails to exercise ordinary care
and is guilty of negligence .... I
Instruction D: Knowledge of the defective or dangerous condition
The owner or occupant of the premises is not liable for an
injury or injuries suffered by persons on his premises if such
injury resulted from a defective or dangerous condition of which
he had no knowledge and of which knowledge could not be
gained through the exercise of ordinary care. He (the owner or
occupant) also is under no duty to call to the person's attention
open, unconcealed or obvious dangers."'
If, however, the condition existed for such a length of time
that the owner or occupant in the exercise of reasonable care in
inspecting the premises, would have discovered the condition in
time to remedy it or to give a warning before an injury occurred,
failure to so act constitutes negligence.
If the owner or occupant, exercising ordinary care, discovered
the defective or dangerous condition before the time of the injury,
but not long enough before to provide him with time reasonably
necessary to remedy the condition, he has a duty to warn the
entrant of such danger, provided a reasonable man could have
done so under the same or similar circumstances.
A warning, if given, must be adequate to enable a reasonably
prudent person to take the steps necessary to avoid harm."'
In instruction D, the duty imposed upon the owner or occupant
in instruction C is more clearly and specifically explainied. Again,
the key consideration is the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
Instruction E:
duty

Factors considered in determining existence of

113. This is a modification of the invitee instruction in Wis. J. I.-CIVIL No. 8020.
114. See WIs. J. I.-CIVIL No. 8020.
115. CALIF. J. I.-CIVIL (5th ed.) § 8.00.
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In determining if the defendant was under such a duty of care,
you are instructed to consider all the surrounding circumstances
including, but not limited to, the foreseeability by the owner or
occupant of the presence of persons on his land,"' and the time,
manner and place of the person's entry onto the land."' Also to
be considered are the likelihood that the owner's or occupant's
conduct would cause an injury and the possibility of serious injury if one should, in fact, occur."'
Instruction E is derived from premises liability cases in which
the reasonable man standard was used. This instruction would,
hopefully, establish an analytical framework from which the jury
could assess the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct and
determine whether he fulfilled his duty of ordinary care.
Critical in a comparative negligence jurisdiction such as Wisconsin would be a contributory negligence instruction. As explained in Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction No. 1007, the plaintiff
must take precautions to avoid an injury to himself as would be
taken by an ordinarily prudent person in a similar situation at and
immediately prior to the accident.
The jury should be instructed to consider all circumstances
surrounding the injury. This consideration could include a determination of whether the plaintiff knew or should have known the
nature of the use of the premises, a determination as to the likelihood that the plaintiff's conduct on the premises would result in
his injury, a determination of whether the plaintiff received a warning and the adequacy of the warning, and whether the defect causing the injury was open and obvious or was concealed. These factors could serve as starting points for the jury's inquiry into the
question of contributory negligence.
It should be noted that in a situation where a child is the entrant
upon the land and the subsequent plaintiff, additional instructions
should be given regarding the child's age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience, and the duty to exercise the same degree of care ordinarily exercised by a child possessing like qualities
and faced with the same or similar circumstances." 9 In this situation, an instruction could also be given regarding the parents' duty
116. 469 F.2d at 106 & n. 48.
117. Mass. _,
297 N.E.2d at 52.
118. 469 F.2d at 105.
119. WIs. J. L-VIL No. 1010.
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to protect and (supervise) their minor child (the plaintiff) by taking
reasonable precautions for his or her safety.2 0
VII.

CONCLUSION

The present system of classification with respect to trespassers,
licensees and invitees is outmoded because, despite the development of numerous distinctions and refinements it fails to adequately reflect the societal shift to placing protection of human life
above the sanctity of private property.
Most jurisdictions continue to cling to the common law approach, relying on concepts and values developed in feudalism. As
Justice Holmes said:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Terpstrahas indicated a willingness to review the traditional classifications of trespassers, licensees and invitees in the context of modern social trends. The
dignity of the human could be elevated over the dignity of property
interests in the court's review. Such a review in the near future
could place Wisconsin among the early jurisdictions to abolish the
outmoded concepts for determining the liability of owners and
occupiers of land.
MARK A. PETERSON
120. Wis. J. I.-CIVIL No. 1012.
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